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Abstract—In modern embedded systems, the trust in com-
prehensive security standards all along the product life cycle has
become an increasingly important access-to-market requirement.
However, these security standards rely on mandatory immunity
assumptions such as the integrity and authenticity of an initial
system configuration typically loaded from Non-Volatile Memory
(NVM). This applies especially to FPGA-based Programmable
System-on-Chip (PSoC) architectures, since object codes as well
as configuration data easily exceed the capacity of a secure boot
ROM. In this context, an attacker could try to alter the content
of the NVM device in order to manipulate the system. The
PSoC therefore relies on the integrity of the NVM particularly at
boot-time. In this paper, we propose a methodology for securely
booting from an NVM in a potentially unsecure environment
by exploiting the reconfigurable logic of the FPGA. Here, the
FPGA serves as a secure anchor point by performing required
integrity and authenticity verifications prior to the configuration
and execution of any user application loaded from the NVM
on the PSoC. The proposed secure boot process is based on
the following assumptions and steps: 1) The boot configuration
is stored on a fully encrypted Secure Digital memory card
(SD card) or alternatively Flash acting as NVM. 2) At boot time,
a hardware design called Trusted Memory-Interface Unit (TMIU)
is loaded to verify first the authenticity of the deployed NVM and
then after decryption the integrity of its content. To demonstrate
the practicability of our approach, we integrated the methodology
into the vendor-specific secure boot process of a Xilinx Zynq
PSoC and evaluated the design objectives performance, power
and resource costs.
Index Terms—Security, Memory-Protection, SoC, FPGA, Se-
cure Boot, Hardware/Software Co-Design
I. INTRODUCTION
Many applications in emerging domains like the Internet
of Things (IoT), industrial and automotive control as well
as medical data processing depend on rigorous trustworthi-
ness as well as system integrity. However, the fact that the
deployment of these embedded systems in the field requires
to control/program them remotely makes them susceptible
to malicious manipulation and data or Intellectual Property
(IP) theft. In order to cope with changing requirements over
the lifetime of a product, connected and upgradable FPGA-
based Programmable System-on-Chip (PSoC) architectures are
gaining more and more interest and visibility. Examples are
platforms for the Industrial IoT, autonomous driving, multi-
camera surveillance, cloud computing, connected health and
other applications [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Especially here, undermining
the security can have significant negative impact including
monetary deficits, loss of privacy, and even physical damages.
This paper addresses the challenges of protecting the in-
tegrity and authenticity of such systems during boot, but
also operational mode in a potentially unsecure environment.
Since a processor typically boots from Non-Volatile Memory
(NVM), e.g., a Flash memory or an external SD card, trust can
only be assumed in case that this NVM can be a) unambigu-
ously identified and b) checked that the content has not been
altered by an attacker. Moreover, such NVM also often stores
not only software, but also the configuration data of proprietary
hardware IP blocks to be loaded to the reconfigurable fabric
of an FPGA. In addition, on many devices, the memory is
used to store sensitive user data, as well as login credentials
which also must be protected. Nevertheless, an adversary with
physical access could copy or even modify the content of the
NVM in order to steal these valuable data, execute malicious
code, or load undesirable hardware configurations [6]. In this
context, researchers have just recently discovered unpatchable
security flaws on Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ PSoCs [7]. Here, a
certain secure boot mode does not authenticate the boot image
metadata and partition header tables stored on NVM, which
leaves this data vulnerable to malicious modifications. As a
consequence, an attacker could modify the boot header and
partition tables to load arbitrary code, thereby bypassing the
entire security measures offered by the vendor’s secure boot
process. Other attacks have shown that particularly configura-
tion bitstreams could be manipulated in a way that the system
exposes security sensitive information such as user data or
keys [8, 9].
To address these problems and to ensure the confidentiality
and integrity of the entire system configuration, a strong
scheme for authentication of NVM and its content that extends
beyond existing methods is required. In this paper, we propose
therefore a hardware-centric boot process for PSoCs from
NVM. Its central component realized in reconfigurable logic is
called Trusted Memory-Interface Unit placed as an intermedi-
ate instance between the processor and the NVM to guarantee
integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity of hardware/software
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programmable SoC configurations over the whole product
lifetime, see Fig. 1. The main features of this hardware unit
are:
• Entire NVM authentication as well as sector-wise de- and
encryption including metadata.
• On-the-fly key generation for symmetric encryption in-
stead of external key storage.
• Instant integrity checking of the boot image before any
user application program is loaded into volatile memory.
This offers several advantages over conventional software-
only solutions and can build upon existing methods provided
by PSoC vendors resulting in a depth layered security. For
instance, changing security requirements during the prod-
uct lifetime can be addressed by upgrading the deployed
cryptographic primitives, while software vulnerabilities and
performance or power constraints are targeted through isolated
execution in dedicated hardware accelerators. In addition,
without the need for external key exchange, the TMIU allows
to tie the NVM content to a specific PSoC device. In this way,
these components form a permanent and immutable system to
protect proprietary IP and sensitive data. In consequence, a
configuration is only bootable from an NVM when it has been
successfully authenticated and found in an unaltered condition.
Subsequently, this raises both the trust and security level of
the entire system and allows the system designer to keep track
of the delivered IP.
In the following, we define the steps and flow of this
secure boot process and the concept and structure of the
TMIU. Subsequently, we integrate this concept into the secure
boot process on a Xilinx Zynq PSoC-platform containing
an Artix-7-based Programmable Logic (PL) and a dual-core
ARM Cortex-A9 Processing System (PS). Finally, we analyze
performance as well as power and resource overhead of
the proposed protection mechanisms. The remaining of the
paper is organized as follows: Section II presents related
work. Our system and threat model is briefly introduced in
Section III. The proposed protection process and the hardware
design of the TMIU concept is described in Section IV.
Finally, experimental results of the secure boot methodology
are demonstrated in Section V, followed by a conclusion and
outlook on future work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In the recent past, several mechanisms have been proposed
to provide trustworthy operation of embedded systems on the
one side and the prevention of IP theft on the other side. These
mechanisms include the deployment of cryptographic hard-
ware, secure boot, the implementation of Physical Unclonable
Functions (PUFs), and techniques for IP protection [10, 11, 12,
13, 14]. In this context, FPGAs have been proven to offer all
necessary means for protection of confidentiality, integrity, and
authenticity. Nevertheless, volatile FPGAs have an Achilles
heel: they are highly vulnerable to bitstream manipulation, so-
called tamper attacks, which can cause unwanted and illegal
behavior or even lead to the leakage of sensitive data such as
IP and secret keys.
Previous work has also shown that reverse-engineering of
Lookup Table (LUT) content from an unencrypted FPGA
bitstream is possible [15]. As a countermeasure, the FPGA
vendors provide anti-tamper techniques such as symmetric
bitstream encryption (AES-256) and private/public key authen-
tication (HMAC + SHA-256, RSA-2048) already since a very
long time. By encrypting the bitstream, the design is protected
against any attempt to clone or reverse engineer valuable
IP [16]. Whereas, bitstream encryption must be combined with
authentication to protect the device against manipulation (e. g.,
fault and Trojan injection) and to ensure that the bitstream
comes from a trusted authority [17]. On Xilinx FPGAs, this
can be accomplished by available hardwired on-chip crypto
modules, while the necessary decryption keys can be stored
on either one-time programmable E-Fuse registers or battery-
backed RAM [14]. However, both the AES and the SHA
modules are not accessible from the programmable logic,
and therefore, not applicable for any custom cryptographic
system design. Moreover, neither hardwired instances nor on-
chip key storage can provide absolute security guarantees. For
example, in the work of Moradi et al. [18, 19], a side-channel
attack is described that performs Differential Power Analysis
(DPA) during bitstream encryption to extract the secret AES
key, while Skorobogatov [20] proposes optical fault injection
attacks to extract decryption keys from secure embedded
memory. In [21], a fault injection attack on an FPGA is
described by tampering of configuration bits inside Block
RAMs (BRAMs) to extract the AES key. Countermeasures
targeting key theft can be realized by PUF implementations
to generate FPGA-internal keys. However, these rely either
on the reverse engineering complexity of undocumented bit-
streams [22] or trivialise negative effects on their reliability
caused by aging and harsh environment conditions [23, 24].
In comparison, our approach builds in the first instance on
the basic capabilities already provided by commercial FPGAs
and adds an additional but necessary layer of security by
verifying the deployed NVM and the use of on-the-fly key
generation to minimize the risk of system exposure. Moreover,
the required cryptographic primitives are fully embedded into
the programmable logic, and therefore, allow for customization
if the security demands will change.
Although dedicated hardware units with cryptographic en-
gines such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) and Hardware
Security Modules (HSMs) are widely used on conventional
processor-based systems, cf. [25], and also concepts for their
combination with FPGAs exists [10], the requirements on
highly integrated PSoC architectures differ. The initialization
of both hardware and software after power-up is a unique
feature of PSoCs. For this reason, the PSoC vendors provide
the option to initialize a system in a secure boot mode.
However, previous PSoC generations used the embedded com-
ponents (processors and peripherals) as slave devices to the
FPGA, whereas for instance, the widely used Xilinx Zynq
device family now uses the processing system as the master
and the programmable logic as the slave [26]. This leads to
several problems, software attacks such as code injection to
trigger buffer overflows or hardware Trojans to apply direct
memory or bus manipulation threaten now the whole system
security. In addition, the Xilinx secure boot process is based
on the creation of a chain of trust with the processor loading
the entire system configuration from NVM while relying on
the confidentiality of the decryption keys stored on-board.
Although the system may take the verification and encryption
of the bitstream into account, the system cannot detect or
prevent any manipulation of the boot image metadata or
partition tables of the NVM, which leaves this data vulnerable
to malicious modifications [7].
Indeed, the secure boot process on Xilinx Zynq PSoC
systems can be bypassed. This was demonstrated in [27]
by direct memory manipulation through malicious hardware
insertion. Here, the authors exploit the vulnerability of the
processor-centric architecture of Xilinx PSoCs to circumvent
the secure boot process by adding an IP block with direct
memory access to the FPGA configuration. At the moment
the processor loads the bitstream from NVM to initialize the
FPGA fabric, the malicious IP block begins to scan the main
memory for the boot parameters while the processor is still
booting. As soon as these parameters are found, they are
modified in a way that the processor loads an unauthorized
software image from a remote server over the network instead
of continuing the boot from NVM. In fact, such an attack
can only be successful if the processor already loaded and
executed code to provide the required network capabilities.
The authors provide countermeasures against this form of
attack by applying a hardware wrapper for IP blocks to prevent
unauthorized memory access. Other solutions exist in the form
of hardware sandboxes as proposed in [28]. However, our
following approach is fundamentally different in specifying
a hardware-centric secure boot process, where the loading
of tampered configurations from NVM to volatile memory is
prevented by direct hardware authentication.
An approach similar to us addressing the secure boot on
PSoCs, is Self-Authenticating Secure Boot (SASB) proposed
by Pocklassery et al. in [12]. Here, first an unencrypted bit-
stream is loaded from NVM to implement a PUF architecture
on the FPGA. In a second step, challenges are applied to the
PUF to generate a device unique key and to perform self-
authentication of the loaded bitstream. Afterwards, the key is
used to decrypt the user application for the unused portion
of the FPGA as well as software that runs on the processor.
The authors claim that the secure boot process is protected
in a way that any modification made to the unencrypted
bitstream results in key regeneration failure of the PUF.
Potential drawbacks of this method are supposably significant
resource requirements of the SASB implementation and the
fact that not only the initial bitstream but also the required First
Stage Bootloader (FSBL) is stored unencrypted on the device,
which in consequence can be tampered. Moreover, neither the
deployed device can be locked to its intended configuration
nor is the configuration verified if the NVM memory gets
manipulated after the boot was successful. Instead, we leverage
existing vendor techniques by making use of the device ID
NVM
Boot Image
File System
TMIU
FPGA
Processor DDRPROM
PSoC
Fig. 1: Proposed security architecture involving a fully en-
crypted SD card as Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) storing
the boot image as well as a file system from which a
Programmable System-on-Chip (PSoC) is booted. The NVM
interacts with the processor over a proposed Trusted Memory-
Interface Unit (TMIU), which is loaded from a one-time
programmable ROM (PROM) into the programmable logic of
the FPGA.
provided internally by an FPGA and a unique ID of the
NVM to form an unseparable unit of device and configuration.
The integrity of swapped data after the secure boot is in
our approach verified by calculating a hash for every sector
exchanged between the processor and the NVM. Furthermore,
as we will show, our solution considers not only the integrity
but also the confidentiality of data during operation through
hardware-based full memory encryption including the FSBL.
III. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
Our system architecture is any common PSoC as illustrated
in Fig. 1, where an SRAM-based FPGA is tightly coupled with
one or multiple processors integrated on a single chip. Both
the processor and the FPGA have access to an external main
memory (DDR), where data is transferred after successful
boot. Yet, the data exposure of this memory by, for instance,
pin probing is not considered in this work. Instead, we consider
the security vulnerabilities caused by access to NVM. Since
SRAM-based FPGAs employ volatile memory, our approach
expects the system to start the boot process from a small one-
time programmable ROM (PROM) to provide an initial FPGA
configuration after power-up. The PROM on the PSoC must
be programmed ahead of shipment to contain the encrypted
and signed TMIU bitstream. This bitstream is loaded initially
into a dedicated area of the FPGA to serve as a trusted
anchor between the processor and an NVM device from which
subsequently, the operating system (kernel images and device
trees), partial bitstreams, and even entire file systems are
booted.
As for the attack model, we assume that the goal of an
attacker is to access or modify proprietary and sensitive data
stored on the NVM. This includes IP in the form of object
code intended to run on the processor, full or partial hardware
designs, or sensitive user data. Furthermore, it is assumed that
the adversary has full physical access to the NVM device
and can monitor and modify all communication lines to/from
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Fig. 2: Flow diagram of the proposed hardware-centric 4-stage secure boot process from Non-Volatile Memory (NVM).
the NVM. Invasive attacks, including destructive methods to
manipulate FPGA internals, system or component package
damages, as well as denial of-service attacks are not taken into
account. Again, attacks on the unprotected main memory for
which countermeasures exist, e. g., [29], are not in our scope.
Side channel attacks such as the analysis of power traces
collected from the cryptographic operations performed inside
the TMIU are in the scope of future work. We mainly address
the integrity and confidentiality of the system’s data stored
on NVM and, based on this, conclude a secure boot process
and operation. Moreover, we assume that the NVM content
is fully encrypted using a PSoC-internally generated key and
shipped together with the device. The initial configuration of
the NVM is created and transferred encrypted by the PSoC
without the used key leaving the device. In case the NVM
should be stolen, the information on the NVM still remains
confidential due to encryption, but the PSoC will not boot –
as desired. Further details of the key generation process are
discussed in Section IV-B.
IV. PROPOSED SECURE BOOT PROCESS
This section describes the secure boot process for PSoCs
from an encrypted mass storage NVM device. The general
approach is based on the idea of an isolated execution of
security-critical operations in the reconfigurable logic of the
FPGA to guarantee a trustworthy system.
A. Boot Process
Figure 2 illustrates the proposed 4-stage boot process pro-
viding a hardware-based chain of trust to the NVM that
includes the boot image of the PSoC. This 4-stage process
is explained in the following. In stage 1), after power-on, the
Trusted Memory-Interface Unit (TMIU) according to Fig. 1 is
loaded from the PROM to a designated area of the reconfig-
urable logic region of the FPGA. The TMIU architecture itself
will be described in details in Section IV-C, see also Fig. 3.
The PSoC is authenticated by a unique, non-volatile device
identifier denoted as IDdev.. For IDdev. we make use of a 57-
bit, read-only, unique board-level-identifier that Xilinx calls
Device DNA [14]. This Device DNA is burned into an E-
Fuse register during the manufacturing process and can only
be internally read by the FPGA design (JTAG needs to be
disabled ahead of shipment). Similar mechanisms are offered
also by other FPGA vendors such as Intel/Altera over their
ALTCHIP_ID Port [30]. In our implementation, the TMIU is
reading out this register after power on. If the identifier is
not matching a cryptographic hash compiled into the TMIU
bitstream itself, the system will go into a secure lockdown
mode. Other essential peripherals for booting from NVM
such as clocks, General-Purpose I/Os (GPIOs), and memory
controller are also initialized at this stage. Last in stage 1),
to enable the communication between the NVM and the
processor of the PSoC, a irreducible minimum of software
is executed to establish the NVM communication protocol.
Once the TMIU has been loaded, initialized, and the PSoC
device is authenticated successfully, the system goes into a
memory identification mode (cf. Fig. 2 stage 2) to authenticate
the connected NVM. In our following experiments, we use an
SD card as non-volatile mass storage device. This card iden-
tifies itself via its unique 128-bit Card Identification number
(CID), which is common praxis for memory identification and
exist also for Flash and other NVM devices. The CID, which
is factory-stamped and unchangeable, is encoded in the cards
internal registers. For this reason, as long as the card complies
to the official SD standard, the CID value denoted as IDNV M
can be used to lock the PSoC with device identifier IDdev.
uniquely together with the SD card with identifier IDNV M . If
one does not trust the CID alone, then for instance, the Card-
Specific Data (CSD) register or other card internal information
can be used in combination for authentication. The TMIU
compares the IDNV M number with a reference checksum
also compiled into the bitstream to determine whether it is
safe to activate the memory’s data transfer function. In the
situation where a different NVM is deployed, the IDNV M is
consequently not matching with the calculated checksum. In
this case, all I/O functions of the NVM are suspended and the
overall system will go into a secure lockdown mode.
The third stage, also implemented fully in hardware, in-
volves the key generation with subsequent boot image decryp-
tion and authentication. Here, the memory identifier IDNV M is
used together with the internally-read device identifier IDdev. to
perform on-the-fly key generation. As it will be discussed more
detailed in Section IV-B, this guarantees a secure generation
of the secret AES key denoted as KAES to decrypt the boot
image and other data stored on the NVM. After decryption,
two additional authentication checks are performed. Due to the
fact, that we assume full encryption of data on the NVM, we
authenticate in a first step the encrypted Master Boot Record
(MBR) of the NVM including partition tables and other
metadata. The MBR is widely used and has established itself
as the de facto standard partition table for storage media of all
kinds. In a second step, the integrity of the entire boot image is
checked by means of a SHA digest calculation. This is done by
padding the unencrypted boot image in a secure environment
to a suitable message length and appending the corresponding
hash token denoted as Tauth., before storing it encrypted on
the NVM. At boot time and after successful decryption of the
overall boot image, the calculated hash is compared against
the appended one. In this way, any tampering of the encrypted
boot image will be detected through a different digest value,
which in turn, will lead to an immediate termination of the
boot process. Moreover, after successful boot, the system stays
upgradable at any time for secure remote updates/upgrades
performed by a trusted authority. After an authenticated remote
login, a boot image could then even be replaced by a newer
version on the boot partition of the NVM. In that case, after
an automatic reboot cycle, the system would load the new
configuration. Alternatively, the old boot image could be kept
as a backup if space permits and serve as a fallback in an
event, where the new boot image could not be loaded as
expected. Thus, the entire system remains flexible and reduces
in consequence the total costs of ownership.
We assume that the boot image can either contain one or
multiple partial bitstreams to initialize the unutilized FPGA
logic in combination with a bare-metal processor application
or a Second Stage Bootloader (SSBL) such as U-Boot1 to
deploy a Linux-based Operating System (OS). Persistent data
storage requires a second data partition to mount the appropri-
ate encrypted file system. Not only during the boot process,
but also during the normal operational mode of the system,
the TMIU will retain the full memory en-/decryption and hash
calculation, for instance, when data is swapped to/from main
memory.
Stage 4: Only if the boot partition has been successfully
loaded, the TMIU will hand over control to the processor
system on the PSoC to setup the remaining operating system
and finally starts the user application.
In summary, if any stage stops legitimization, the sys-
tem will go into a secure lockdown mode, which prevents
unintended system behavior and data release. Hereafter, we
1https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/
describe the key generation scheme and the implementation
of the TMIU in detail.
B. Key Generation Scheme
As mentioned in Section II, FPGA vendors provide on-
chip key storage for bitstream decryption. To hamper the
risk of key theft, we generate the keys for decrypting the
boot image and other data stored on the NVM only after
authentication, e. g., only if the combination of a PSoC with
the device identifier IDdev. and the NVM identifier IDNV M
are successfully authenticated. This on-the-fly key generation
is performed by applying the Concatenation Key Derivation
Function (CKDF) [31]. As unique salt we utilize the memory
identifier IDNV M denoted as the byte-string OtherIn f o and
concatenate this together with the secret device identifier IDdev.
and a counter value c. In this way, the CKDF uses the SHA
implementation embedded in the TMIU (cf. Fig. 3) to calculate
a pseudorandom Hash-function H() for key derivation. Here,
the CKDF is applied as a cryptographic secure key expansion
function to derive the required 128-bit key for the AES from
the 57-bit IDdev., while at the same time the difficulty of a brute
force attack increases by the number of iterations specified
trough c.
The output of this calculation is an FPGA-internal unique
secret, based on the external memory identifier IDNV M and the
private device identifier IDdev. that can be used as a symmetric
de-/encryption key. Equation (1) shows this derivation to
generate the secret AES key KAES.
An alternative to the vendor-provided device IDs could be to
rely, for some use cases, on a PUF implementation for device
authentication as proposed in [13, 24]. However, in addition to
extra costs in terms of FPGA resources for a proof of concept
implementation, we decided to go for the vendor ID.
KAES = H(c||IDdev.||OtherIn f o) (1)
The TMIU reads the unique device identifier at the time
power is applied and compares this number to a reference
checksum compiled into the TMIU bitstream. The same ap-
plies to the NVM identifier IDdev., at the memory identification
stage. So even if an attacker could read out the cards internal
CID register or probes the communication signals, no plaintext
attack on the key is feasible, because the attacker has no
possibility to obtain the FPGA internal IDdev. from a locked
(i. e., JTAG disabled) device. In addition, the keys are only
applied within the programmable logic of the PSoC. Further-
more, a reset or power shutdown clears all generated keys and
information. It follows that the card or any other connected
memory device behaves similar to a passive dongle to tie
permanently and immutable proprietary IP to an authorized
device. Replacing either the memory device or changing its
content or connecting a different PSoC device would result
in a key generation failure and prevent the system from
booting. Moreover, the NVM itself is only read- and writable
in combination with the intended PSoC device. In this context,
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Fig. 3: Trusted Memory-Interface Unit (TMIU) building blocks enabling a secure boot from external Non-Volatile Memory
(NVM).
also different key handling or diversification procedures are
conceivable. For instance, multiple encryption keys could be
used across multiple memory partitions to further reduce the
attack surface of the system.
C. Trusted Memory Interface Unit
To get a better understanding of how the TMIU interacts
with the NVM device, which is in our case the SD card, first
a brief introduction of the required Secure Digital Input/Output
(SDIO) protocol specification is given. The SDIO protocol is
the standard not only for removable SD cards but also for their
on-board embedded counterpart the embedded Multi Media
card (eMM card) and applies the master/slave principle, where
a host controller communicates over two dedicated interfaces
with the memory. A data bus is used to read or write data
from the host to the memory on a bidirectional data interface
(DATA). Here, data transfers to/from the SD card are per-
formed in a single or multi-block read/write fashion. A block
represents the data of a specific memory sector of 512 bytes
on the card and is always followed by its 16-bit polynomial
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) value. This block-based
communication allows our sector-wise de-/encryption and hash
calculation of the memory sections. In addition, data transfers
are triggered after the controller issues specific commands over
a bidirectional command interface (CMD). These commands
regulate the execution of protocol routines based on responses
received from the memories internal controller. Similar to
the data bus, every command sequence is protected by a 7-
bit CRC. The case that the calculated CRC value, either for
commands or data transmissions, does not match the attached
one, triggers a repetition which adds an additional layer of
security to the protocol.
The TMIU is integrated as an intermediate instance to mon-
itor and control the communication behavior between memory
and host. Figure 3 provides a high-level description of its
building blocks. As can be seen, the ports for the data and com-
mand lines are the only access points of the TMIU interfacing
the processor and the connected NVM. On the right hand
side, the ports towards the processor system are shown. The
commands sent and received by the processor are observed by
the component NVM_CMD Controller within the TMIU.
This controller serves not only for authentication but also to
regulate the communication sequence between the processor
system on the PSoC and the NVM. More precisely, if any
tampering on either memory or processor side occurs, the
NVM_CMD Controller would intervene and immediately
terminate the transmission. As mentioned earlier, a deployed
SD card needs to authenticate itself via its CID during the
memory identification stage at boot-time. As soon as the
card sends the CID, the NVM_CMD Controller proofs and
forwards this value to a Key Generator module. The Key
Generator checks whether the received memory identifier
IDNV M and the internally-read device identifier IDdev. complies
with the pre-initialized checksums and reports this back to the
NVM_CMD Controller before triggering the generation of
the 128-bit AES key KAES. After successfully finishing the
memory initialization and authentication step, the NVM_CMD
Controller permits the processor to transfer data and keeps
track of the accessed sector numbers.
If not carefully designed, the TMIU with its cryptographic
operations would have the potential to heavily slow down not
only the boot process but also general system performance. As
high data throughput from memory to PSoC and vice versa is
a must, special care has been taken in the implementation
of the dedicated NVM_DATA Controller. In particular, all
internal components are interconnected by a streaming inter-
face. This interface is designed for high-speed data throughput
and supports burst transmissions of unlimited size. Therefore,
no address mechanism or explicit synchronization is needed,
which makes it ideal for pipelined data streaming. However,
incoming data from the memory or the processor must first
be proven non-faulty, e. g., against any transmission errors
(e. g., bit flips). This is done by CRC calculation before data
is forwarded to the AES de-/encryption module. If the CRC
check is not successful, the data is sent unencrypted to the
PSoC to trigger a CRC error resulting in a new transmission.
After de-/encryption, the CRC value is calculated again and
subsequently attached to the data block before forwarding it
to the PSoC/NVM.
Our AES core supports sector-wise both de- and encryption
and is switching between these two modes depending on the
communication direction. The key which was used initially
for encrypting the memory content in the secure environment
ahead of shipment is now also applied when writing/reading
data to/from NVM at boot-time and during the operational
mode of the system. In this way, we can guarantee that at
any point in time, only encrypted data is stored on NVM.
Moreover, the NVM content is only deployable on the intended
PSoC device.
The NVM_DATA Controller utilizes the 256-bit SHA
algorithm to compare the calculated boot image hash token
against the sent one Tauth.. If the calculated hash is not
matching the appended one, the NVM_DATA Controller
modifies the last byte to provoke a CRC error on the processor
side to invalidate the data transmission, while the NVM_CMD
Controller disables any further attempts to transfer data.
In a similar fashion, sector authentication is performed after
successful booting, when reading or writing data to the NVM.
In this way, every sector is stored with a hash and fully
encrypted on the NVM making any manipulation immediately
detectable. Later, when a reset or power-off is applied, all
internal registers are cleared and the TMIU will again start
the proposed multi-stage boot process.
Finally, the TMIU is supposed to be clearly separated from
the user design, while the remaining non-configured regions
are free and can be used for user applications. This gets
possible through the partial reconfiguration and isolated place
and route capabilities of modern FPGAs [32]. In particular,
it allows us to dynamically perform partial reconfigurations
of certain independent regions to update the desired system
functionality when the system is applied in the field. Therefore,
the TMIU with all its security sensitive primitives is logically
and spatially isolated and runs totally independent from other
applications.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, our proposed hardware-centric boot pro-
cess and TMIU design is evaluated on a Xilinx Zynq
xc7z010clg400-1 placed on the Digilent Zybo evaluation
board, see Fig. 4. For a proof of concept, an SD card has
been chosen as non-volatile mass data storage device for the
following reasons: SD as well as eMM cards are cost effective
due to their high memory density and good cost-per-bit ratio,
making them suitable for storing relatively large amounts of
data such as user data. Moreover, they can be easily used in
a number of small, lightweight and low-cost systems due to
their low-power consumption and standard sizes, which is a
common requirement for many embedded and IoT devices.
Nevertheless, the approach is not restricted to SD cards. Also
different forms of NVM with similar properties such as Solid-
State Drives (SSDs) or Flash chips are possible.
In order to successfully boot from a Zynq device, the
experimental setup illustrated in Fig. 4 was required: As
a PROM which would allow to store the bitstream of our
TMIU that needs to be loaded initially is not available on
the Zynq, we used an on-board (bottom side) available 17 MB
VM: DDR
NVM: SD card
PROM:
Flash
(bottom
side)
PSoC
Status LEDs indicating a
sucessful authentication
of each step in the 4-
stage boot process
Fig. 4: Secure boot setup on a Xilinx Zynq evaluation board.
programmable Flash. This Flash is connected over a SPI-Flash
controller with the processing system to emulate our PROM
and assumptions introduced in Section III. The storage re-
quirement for the encrypted TMIU implementation is 1.9 MB
in total, with the bitstream accounting for the major part of the
storage size. Beside the Flash memory, a 16 GB SD card was
connected via an external MicroSD card slot to the PSoC. The
card was formatted with one 100 MB FAT32 bootable partition
containing the required boot image, device tree and the Linux
kernel image. The remaining card space was utilized as ext4
partition to provide the Linux root file system. Furthermore,
in our evaluation the boot process involves the configuration
of the processor and the hardware. Therefore, the boot image
includes a partial FPGA configuration in combination with the
Second Stage Bootloader (SSBL) (U-Boot in this case) to load
the kernel image and setup a Linux OS. Next, the processing
system on the Zynq is routed via its SDIO interface to the
TMIU ports on the FPGA. The clock speed of the TMIU
adapts during the memory initialization phase according to the
connected card standard. In this work, we were using a high
speed card clocked by 50 MHz. To visualize the in Fig. 2
proposed 4-step boot process, four status LEDS were used
indicating every successful authentication.
Furthermore, the Xilinx Vivado Design suite 2018.1 was
utilized to synthesize the TMIU on the aforementioned Zynq
PSoC. Here, the design objectives performance, power, and
resource costs were collected at a 20 ns clock cycle time. The
amount of required FPGA resources for the TMIU implemen-
tation in terms of Flip-Flops (FFs), Lookup Tables (LUTs),
and 36K BRAMs – no Digital Signal Processor (DSP) 48-
slices were needed – is highlighted in Table I. The numbers
indicate that, with 39% of LUTs and 17% of FFs on the second
smallest PSoC from the Zynq family, a TMIU implementation
is even feasible on entry-level PSoC devices.
Concerning power consumption, an estimation including
both static and dynamic power of the overall design including
the TMIU netlist was obtained using the Vivado Power anal-
ysis tool. The switching activity was derived from constraints
and simulation files. As a result, considering the additional
FPGA resources introduced by the TMIU, the overall power
consumption of the design rises from 1.53 to 1.62 Watt, which
is an overhead of only 5%. In this overall power, the processor
consumes about 92% of the dynamic on-chip power, while
clock and register activity of the TMIU contributes to 8% of
the dynamic power. The static device power amounts to 7%
of the overall power consumption.
In the following, we evaluate the boot time and achievable
data transmission rate between NVM and PSoC using the
proposed TMIU concept and implementation. Figure 5 shows
the time needed for loading the TMIU configuration and the
First Stage Bootloader (FSBL) from a PROM including the
time for TMIU initialization and mutual device authentication
(steps 1-3 in Fig. 2) which amounts to 98 ms corresponding to
a throughput of 19.4 MBs−1. Thereafter, the TMIU continues
booting the Linux OS from the NVM. In our experiment,
data with a total size of 13 MB for the required boot image,
device tree and the Linux kernel image is loaded. The time
for this subsequent boot from an SD card specified to provide
a maximal line rate of 25 MBs−1 was measured as 526 ms
corresponding to a data rate of 24.7 MBs−1. Therefore, the
TMIU design does not reduce the achievable throughput of
the NVM device and perfectly scales with the amount of
data loaded at boot time. Concerning latency, the decryption
and authentication of data in hardware takes 52 clock cycles
to process a sector of size 512 Bytes. Therefore, the boot
time is limited only by the bandwidth of the chosen NVM
medium and its interface. Furthermore, resource, power, and
timing overheads caused by the proposed TMIU approach are
tolerable for the sake of security. An evaluation of alternative
NVM devices is subject of future work.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a novel approach for checking
authenticity of Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) and the integrity
of stored boot images for programmable System-on-Chip
(SoC) devices. Here, apart from boot ROMs, NVM devices
such as SD and eMM cards or Flash memories are typically
used due to their high capacity. In order to prevent any
fraudulent exchange of the memory device or modification
TABLE I: Resource requirements of the proposed TMIU
implementation and its cryptographic building blocks.
Block Num. LUTs FFs BRAMs
Key Generator
abs. 70 249 0
(%) 0.4 0.7 0
NVM_CMD Controller
abs. 83 331 0
(%) 0.5 0.9 0
NVM_DATA Controller
abs. 6630 5354 0.5
(%) 37.7 15.2 0.8
Total abs. 6783 5934 0.5(%) 38.5 16.9 0.8
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Secure
Boot
Time in ms
PROM SD-Card
19.4 MBs−1 24.7 MBs−1
TMIU Bitstream = 1.9 MBBoot Image + Linux Kernel + Device Tree = 13 MB
Fig. 5: Performance of the Trusted Memory-Interface Unit
(TMIU)-based secure boot. In the first phase, the bitstream of
the TMIU is loaded and initialized from PROM. Subsequently,
the boot process continues from an authenticated NVM (in this
case an SD card). As can be seen, the data rate achieved is
close to the 25 MBs−1 line rate of the SD card.
of its content, a fully hardware-centric solution is proposed
in which a so-called Trusted Memory-Interface Unit (TMIU)
is loaded first into the available reconfigurable region of the
FPGA, which then initializes the communication interface
of the PSoC with the NVM device including authentication,
integrity checking, and de-/encryption of data. A 4-stage boot
process and its hardware implementation have been evaluated
in terms of resource utilization, power, and performance. As a
result, the lightweight, low-power TMIU implementation can
be used already in quite small, even IoT devices. Moreover, the
proposed protocol has been shown to not limiting the speed of
the boot process from NVM. Additionally, external key storage
for decryption is avoided through on-the-fly key generation
by making use of unique, factory-stamped IDs given by the
device and the NVM. Due to the fact that our TMIU design and
proposed protocols do not use any vendor-specific hardware
or software primitives, our approach can target any PSoC
platforms integrating processor and FPGA resources on a chip.
In future work, we want to investigate more deeply the
applicability of the proposed approach in combination with
dynamic update/upgrade services and their requirement for
secure off-chip storage including policies for fail-safe fallback
modes if these updates fail. Furthermore, it is planned to
investigate the vulnerability of the approach to side-channel
attacks. Last but not least, we intend to analyze the approach
also for other types of NVM devices.
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